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High-security events in Helsinki: An examination of the current situation and how to improve it

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2015 Leppävaara



Laurea University of Applied Sciences
Leppävaara

High-security events in Helsinki: An examination of the current situation and how to improve it

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Degree Programme in Sec. Mgmt.
Bachelor's Thesis
January, 2015

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Year	2015	Pages	36
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This thesis examines and assesses the foundation of high-security events the methods for their implementation in Helsinki. Research was qualitative in nature and included aspects of operational research, *id est* interviews of two security professionals: Mr Jari Väinölä of Countsec Ltd. and Mr Oskari Salmi.

The current state of affairs with regards to event security and the security situation as a whole, were presumed to be in high and good standing. High-security events were defined in this context as an event of high visibility and importance, but not organized by the Finnish State, as the actors and standard operating procedures on the public side differ greatly from those of the private sector. To provide further substance to the theory, risk analysis and assessment methods were introduced to provide the reader with an understanding of risk management theories and methods of combatting complex threats to security.

Through data analysis and on the basis of the accounts of Mr Väinölä and Mr Salmi, it was to be observed that some aspects and issues rose above else. These were the low level of preparedness and pre-event planning, and the overall lack of security knowledge with the event organizers. Pointed out, that these were obvious gaps for the private sector to provide their services, but still the *façon d'être* of the organizing entity remained unaltered. Ultimately, the level of security was concluded to be as hypothesized, but there was still a distinct lack of knowledge in the private corporate security sector, moreover in the organizing team of an event, about the actual risks and the importance of communication (both internal and external).

Responding to the research question, a method for augmenting the level of professionalism in regards to high-security events and the scene in its entirety, the key recommendation is increased research and the promulgation of the accumulated data onto universities and professional schools.

Event security, international, private sector, recommendations, planning, risk, safety, hazard, management, mitigation

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Vuosi 2015

Sivumäärä 36

Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia ja analysoida tämän hetkistä turvallisuustilannetta Helsingissä korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumia silmälläpitäen. Tutkimus oli luonteeltaan kvalitatiivista, lainaten operatiivisen tutkimuksen metodeja haastatteluiden kautta. Haastatellut henkilöt olivat Countsec Oy:n toimitusjohtaja Jari Väinölä ja turvallisuusasiantuntija Oskari Salmi.

Nykyisen turvallisuustilanteen ja korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumien ammattimaisuuden tason oletettiin olevan korkeita. Korkean turvallisuustason tapahtumat määriteltiin tämän tutkimuspaperin tekoa varten tapahtumiksi, jotka luonteeltaan olivat poikkeuksellisen näkyviä tai tärkeitä, mutta eivät Suomen valtion järjestämiä. Tämä rajaus sisältää sekä kotimaiset että kansainväliset tapahtumat. Lukijan tietotaustan tueksi esiteltiin myös riskianalysismetodeja, jotka myös tukevat tutkimuksen akateemista substanssia.

Lähdeaineistoanalyysin ja haastatteluiden pohjalta pystyttiin havaitsemaan selkeitä yhteneväisyyksiä ja puutteita nykytilassa. Molemmat haastatelluista asiantuntijoista identifioivat huonon etukäteisvarautumisen ja -suunnittelun suurimmaksi ongelmaksi, jossa vaikuttavana tekijänä toimi myös turvallisuusosaamisen puute tapahtumajärjestäjien taholla. Tässä oli huomattavissa, että kyseinen puutos tarjoaa yksityiselle turvallisuusosaamiselle markkinaraon, mutta se ei vaikuta isäntäorganisaation turvallisuuskäyttäytymiseen keskipitkällä tai pitkällä aikavälillä. Hypoteesit osoittautuivat tutkimuksen edetessä oikeiksi, mutta samalla oli havaittavissa selkeä tietotaidon puute turvallisuusasioissa yritysturvallisuustoimijoiden ja organisaatioiden tapahtumasta vastaavien osalta, erityisesti puutteet painottuivat riskien tiedostamiseen ja kommunikaation tärkeyden unohtumiseen.

Tutkimuskysymykseen vastaten, tapa parantaa nykyistä ammattimaisuuden ja turvallisuuden tasoa tapahtumaturvallisuuden puitteissa on tutkimuksen lisääminen ja saavutetun tutkimustiedon jakaminen turvallisuusalan koulutusta tarjoavien oppilaitosten opetussuunnitelmiin.

Tutkimusanalyysi, haastattelu, tapahtumaturvallisuus, kansainvälisyys, riskienhallinta, koulutus, turvallisuustaso, nykytilanne

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Introduction

As the amount of events have increased and are likely to proceed in such a manner in the coming years (City of Helsinki, 2015), it is required for the hosting party to maintain and uphold a sufficient level of safety and security precautions to guarantee a safe execution of said occurrences. It is precisely this framework, in which this research is focused and which it aims at enhancing. This paper additionally examines and recommends aspects to be taken into consideration in regards to high-security events organized in Helsinki. All entities have their special set of needs and the requirements for the events thus change invariably, but regardless of the nature of the event, the core issues examined here remain the same. The notion of event security and safety umbrella refers to the precautions taken in safeguarding people and assets in an intermittent and one-off basis. Thus, the role and implementation methods for such scenes cannot be thoroughly standardized as they vary greatly from an event to another.

Risk is a part of our everyday lives, and due consideration should be made on every step of the way, be it personal acquisitions or large-scale corporate decisions. Risks, on one part, define and dictate the course of our lives. A discussion and debate can be had on the level of risks willing to be taken when it varies considerable among individuals, as some prefer to take bigger risks in the hopes of a better outcome and vice versa.

Regardless of the point of view, the existence of the spotlighted high-security events, discussed in this paper, is imperative. Such existence provides the framework for highly important corporate meetings to take place, sensitive diplomatic discussions to progress and other high visibility events to function unhindered. There are a wide range of views on the fundamental being of these events, as whether a civilized society should have a portion of itself confined behind bars and organize events with restricted access, thus the morality of such scrutinized by their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, such is the status quo and the means to its conservation have become not only more complex, but paramount, in order for the same society to fulfil it's premise to its citizens.

1 Literature review

Events and crowds as individual entities have been thoroughly researched through different points of view, from sociology to natural sciences. It is thus the definition and the framework set by the author and the researcher that dictate the walls around the focused aspect. Due to the security management background of this research, it is expedient to focus on the observable sciences and only refer the definitions to the philosophical side; successful security, after all, is the end result of managed risks.

The cohesive factor within the related literature (and security itself) stems from the basic human instinct for self-preservation and, thus, Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943). The concept of security is derived from these needs, directly succeeding the life and death requirements for food, water, warmth and rest. This is to say that humans have an intrinsic need to be safe and secure. After these conditions have been met, an individual may pursue higher desires such as the need for intimate relationships and ultimately self-actualisation. The existence of and assurance received from properly executed security and safety measures are thusly irreplaceable, even more so with the modern man. The management of risks and the derived security planning has come a long way since the days of Maslow.

A vast majority of the literature within the field of risk management and high-security events are textbook style manuals, and are, for some parts, obsolete. The nature of high-security events has changed dramatically a number of times during the past two decades. Some examples of this literature, written in the 90's, base their points and facts on lessons learned from post soviet-collapse environment where the threats were clear and factual. Today, the same does not fore-go without criticism, as the nature of risks and potential threats to such events have become increasingly more asymmetrical and unconventional. The threat of terrorism is a prime example: it's existence has been known and alive for almost a century (starting from the beginning of WWI anarchists) but never prior to 9/11 has it been given so much consideration and precautions taken to combat the risks. The current state and the threat of terrorism in Finland are discussed in the chapter 3.2.1.

The theoretical point of view with regards to risks and accidents is worthy of acknowledgement. A myriad of ways have been used to define and determine, and to illustrate the cause and causality ratio of these concepts. For in the case of accidents, the first attempt at such was H.W. Heinrich's "Domino Theory" in 1936. It is not, by any standard, the most sophisticated or comprehensive of accident theories, but perhaps the most widely used. The obvious reference is to the behaviour of a set of domino pieces placed next to each other, and thus when one of the pieces fall, subsequently all the other will tumble accordingly. This, according to Heinrich, demonstrates the process of accident causation. One is to be reminded here,

that accidents form an integral part of risk management and hence should not be neglected even in this review. Mr Heinrich determined the five stages of the “Domino Theory”, as follows: the first stage being the risk assorted with social environment and ancestry, second stage the comprehensive set of faults of a person (personal attributes leading to accidents), third being general unsafe acts or conditions (initiation of an incident), fourth the accident itself and the last being injury. The key to the concept of the theory is to remove one of the stages in order to prevent the injury or harm; this can be achieved through policymaking or physical means. Other theories to be mentioned are Ferrell’s “human factor model” and Petersen’s “Accident/incident”-model. More in depth analysis of the theories remains a topic for another research.

Methods of risk management and the theory behind it can be partly derived from Heinrich’s theory, but equally form a subsequent set of definitions and processes of causation unbeknownst to the field of accidents. Risk management theories and issues are discussed in the chapter 2.3 of this paper.

2 Expert methodology and definitions

2.1 Research methods

Here, research methods refer to the type of study conducted to produce this thesis as an end-result of an examination process. Depending on the needs and type of a given research, the according tools and methods are to be applied. For this paper, it was concluded that the model of qualitative research complementing the founding’s of an operational study would result in the most suitable outcome. The definitions and tools of such methods will be discussed in the chapter 3.1.1.

Other common research methodologies include the positivist and qualitative research model, which precede the qualitative methodology. The respective methodology should be appointed per research through observation of research focus and ideas, as the nature of data cannot be effectively analysed through all methods (for example: census statistics through qualitative approach).

Research questions and hypotheses were set for this thesis. The thesis aims to respond and deliver information on the following aspects:

- What is the current situation in Helsinki, in regards to security of events?
- How can this situation and level of security be adjusted and augmented?
- What is the purpose of high level of security with regards to event planning?

Following the research questions, some hypotheses were set on this basis. It was expected and hypothesized that the overall security situation is good and the related threat level to international events in Helsinki is relatively low. The aspects of security in high-security events examined here were postulated to be in good standing but that they could be honed through improved strategy approaches, technical equipment, efficient training and increased communication between event organisers.

2.1.1 Qualitative and operational research

Research is the process of arriving to a conclusion or to procure new information on a set subject through analysis of available data. The data can be collected in amplitude of fashion, thus defining the methodology used. As defined in the planning phase of this thesis, the qualitative approach complemented with operational research were chosen for the purpose of data analysis and procurement.

The qualitative research model yields its existence to the rejection of research positivism, where it was assumed that an objective world exists where necessary data can be collected and the data later verified through empiricism (Seale 2004). The qualitative model is a methodological research method, where data is collected through a variety of tools, with the most common one being 'key informant interview' and following the use of focus groups. Other tools might be shadowing, storytelling or other participant observation methods.

As part of the qualitative research approach, this thesis was conducted mainly in an empiricist manner with additional interviews designed to adhere to the initial substance procured, so as to produce more informational value and expert input.

Theory behind the implications and recommendations made in this paper are founded on expert literature and industry materials, as well as on best practices conducted in the field. The two interviews conducted for this paper are subjective by nature (as interviews generally are), and thus should only be considered to represent the ideology and opinion of the interviewed expert.

It was noted during the research process that some of the information relating, in particular, to the risk assessment of events from the government's side are secret in nature and thus cannot be discussed or examined here further. However, the reader should be aware of the existence of such assessment processes even when it is not emphasised or discussed in this paper. Additionally, the data procured and produced here is bound to change over time as the industry progresses technically, and the socio-economic atmosphere is subject to constant transformation.

2.2 Defining the concepts

Concepts in risk management and, more broadly, in the whole of the field of security are to be carefully defined in order for them to be effectively discussed. A great deal of such concepts may prove to be perplexing for a person not familiar with the sector. This chapter discusses, details and defines the concepts and provides related terminology.

2.2.1 Concepts in security and event management

In regards to terminology, one has to keep in mind, that as security and risk management as terms can be used to describe a multitude of entities or processes, the definition of the term might slightly differ from the classical examples given here. For example, if one is to discuss risk management in the context of chemistry, one is likely to run into toxicology and biosafety - whereas the same term can be also attributed to aspects of physical safeguards of a building.

Term	Definition	Alternative definition
<i>Risk</i>	Exposure to the chance of injury or loss	Someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard
<i>Security</i>	The quality or state of being secure	Things done to make people or places safe
<i>Threat</i>	Indication of something impending	Expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage
<i>Hazard</i>	A source of danger	Something causing unavoidable danger, peril, risk or difficulty
<i>Asset</i>	A useful or desirable thing or quality	An item of value owned
<i>Terrorism</i>	The use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce	The state of fear and submission produced by terrorism or terrorization
<i>Event</i>	Something that happens or is regarded as happening	Something that occurs in a certain place during a particular interval of time
<i>High-level</i>	Being of high importance or rank	Occurring, done or placed at a high-level

(Definitions by Merriam-Webster dictionary, 2015)

The terms defined above were chosen on the basis of the level of precision required for this research: in general context the definitions for such terms might differ decisively.

Focusing in the core aspect of this research, the existence and level of ‘high-security’, a high security event can be defined, for the purposes of this paper, as an event organised by some other entity than the state of Finland and where the need for protection from harm (be they physical damage to personnel or equipment, public image distortions or general disruptions) is more elevated than in a normal event open for public. This definition may include, but is not limited to:

- International artist’s concert or exhibition
- General meeting of a multinational company
- Scientific or religious meeting

- Other meeting, where one or more of the participants are politically, economically or religiously of high importance
- Exhibition or event where extremely valuable assets or items are handled or transported

Term of event security was described by Mr Väinölä as: “a concept extensively incorporating “hard” security” as well as embedding aspects of safety.

2.3 Risk assessment and analysis explained

In the security industry and with every actor or entity aspiring to gain a financial or technological edge on competition, risks are bound to be taken. Be they physical, financial or abstract - security in its nature includes and manages the mitigation of risks.

Entities, depending on the industry and set of goals, have different reasons for managing and mitigating risks. Risk analysis, as such, is merely a management tool - a definition determined by the executive management as what it is ready to accept as loss. One must keep in mind that, risk analysis, as with everything related to the assessment of risks in the field of security (i.e. excluding scientific risk analysis in chemistry, toxicology etc.) is subjective and not an absolute science. However, risk analysis is an orderly and rational approach into examining the probabilities and consequences of an adverse effect (Broder, J; Tucker, E; 2012).

As a management and directional tool, risk analysis is invaluable. It will provide the decision-making actors with factual information on corporate processes and overall security, as to counter the potentially false sense and image of security. This eliminates, if properly executed and only to some extent, the human error aspect of management in security matters as it erases unfounded notions. In a practical sense, it also assembles and conceptualizes the security matters, which can then, in turn, be used as justifications for costly countermeasures (Broder, J; Tucker, E, 2012).

According to Broder (Broder, J; Tucker, E, 2012) risk analysis should be carried out by first identifying the assets to be protected, following the identification of threats and risks on those particular assets and finally determining the probability of the risks occurring to those assets. An integral part of a thorough risk analysis is ‘risk exposure assessment’, in which three further aspects are to be examined:

1. Determining the types of losses that can affect the assets
 - a. What effect would the risk have?
2. Estimate the probability of occurrence of said risks
3. Measure the impact of the risk

These aspects are to be measures and examined in quantitative terms so as to produce comparable data.

2.3.1 Risk assessment techniques

There are a good variety of risk assessment techniques publicly available and more are being constantly produced. Hereafters are presented a few in broad uses. The following methods presented are some of the 31 techniques listed in the Annex B of ISO/IEC 31010.

Brainstorming

As the title indicates, brainstorming relies mainly on individual or group creativity than on scientific methods. The desired result is often a conclusion to an identified problem achieved through group collaboration. This collaboration should be spontaneous in style and in a way where all members are encouraged to contribute, so as to produce diversified points of view that can then, in turn, be shortlisted to result into a common conclusion.

Alex F. Osborn, the father of the concept, claimed that two principles contribute to “ideative efficacy” more than others:

- Defer judgement
- Reach for quantity

To hone these principles further, he developed the method further, which then resulted in the following intentions for the brainstorming sessions:

- Reducing social inhibitions between group members
- Stimulate idea generation
- Increase overall creativity of the group
 - Focus on quantity
 - No criticism
 - Welcome unusual ideas
 - Combine and improve ideas

(Isaksen, 1998)

Brainstorming can be somewhat effectively applied to basic level risk management and assessment, but without thorough empirical knowledge and technical skills of the group members, the results might prove to be infertile.

Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)

The HAZOP-method is a tool to assess and identify risks of current or future processes, so as to weed out threats to personnel and/or equipment. It comprises mainly of a multidisciplinary team, which conducts the analysis through a course of meetings. The meeting should be lead by a chairman competent in safety matters. The method is, in its nature, qualitative and like with brainstorming, it is designed to stimulate participants' imagination and then honing the outcome with guidewords. Initially developed to assess risks in chemical processes (incl. toxicology) and mining operations, but has later extended into use with nuclear power plants and other sensitive system processes.

The method has been criticized for being too time consuming and rather expensive. Additionally, very detailed plans of certain processes are required to properly execute the study. (Health and safety laboratory, 2005).

Scenario analysis

Scenario analysis can be used as a risk assessment method and a way of improving decision-making. In short, it provides the authors of the study a set of possible views of future, scenarios, which can each be assessed separately. Projections being the main method of analysis, the method will yield a variety of different outcome scenarios and the individual paths leading up to those particular outcomes. This is done in order to better examine the possible situations and thus be effectively prepared for every scenario sought out. Importantly, it does not rely on historical data and thus does not assume the observations/projections to be true in the future.

Business impact analysis (BIA)

Business impact analysis is usually seen as being an integral part of the business continuity planning process. As such, during the analysis phase of the planning process, the 'business impact analysis' offers the authors/receiving entity a differentiation of critical and non-critical functions of a given entity. The division between the two categories varies per case, but can be generalized in matters, which effectively disrupt or halt business operations (i.e. unacceptable ones) being labelled as critical and the rest as non-critical. The definition of criticality can be extensive, as a disruption of a business process may occur from purely technical issues to legal obstacles.

Some important definitions for use within the BIA-framework:

- MTPD: Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption

- The maximum amount of time key processes of the entity may be unavailable before disruption of service occurs
- RTO: Recovery Time Objective
 - An agreed frame of time in which the processes must be recovered
- RPO: Recovery Point Objective
 - The interval of time that might pass during a major disruption before the quantity of lost data exceeds the limits of the business continuity plan

(Singh, 2008)

The process starts with assigning two values for each critical function, the RTO and RPO, then following the setting of recovery requirements for each of these functions.

2.3.2 ISO certificates

Certificating and accrediting certain aspects of corporate services, including security and risk management, does have a positive effect on overall image of said entity and ideally helps to boost better corporate culture. Certification/accreditation is sought by many also for reasons of public image through credibility; additionally achieving a certification may boost the customer's trust on the service/good. The most notable standards within the risk management spectrum are found in the ISO 31000 family. The standard family includes, among others:

- ISO 31000:2009 - Principles and Guidelines on Implementation
- ISO/IEC 31010:2009 - Risk Management - Risk assessment techniques
- ISO Guide 73:2009 - Risk Management - Vocabulary

The above-mentioned family of standards provides a standard for the corporate implementation of risk management.

3 High level security events in Helsinki

3.1 Brief history

Given its status of diplomatic non-alignment, Finland, and notably Helsinki as its capital, has had a long and fruitful track record of various successful high-level events and international conferences.

Even as this paper focuses on events where the organiser is some other party than the state of Finland, it would be hypocrite to disregard the most notable conference of recent Finnish history. In July 1975, named as the 'Helsinki Accords', an act was signed in the Finlandia hall

in central Helsinki. It was the climax of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in which thirty-five states joined to sign the declaration, in order to enhance diplomatic relations between the communist eastern bloc and the West. It is this year, 2015, when an OSCE meeting shall also take place in Helsinki, in honour of this first Act.

Remaining with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a ministerial council was summoned in Helsinki (as Finland held chairmanship) in 2008, where a record of 50 foreign ministers gathered to discuss current topics, and the Georgian crisis topped the agenda. (OSCE 2008)

Since 1995, when Finland officially joined the European Union, a number of EU-internal meetings have taken place over the decades in Helsinki. Even if it would seem at first glance, that these events are organised by the Finnish state, they are, in fact coordinated separately by the organising entities in Finland (including the Commission representation in Helsinki) and the arriving party. Thus, as a basis, these events remain within the scope of this research.

Some of the more influential, high-level EU meetings organised in Helsinki include the 2006 Finnish presidency visits of the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament, EU-China summit, EU-Republic of Korea summit, ASEM 6 (Asia-Europe Meeting) and the EU-Russia summit. A notable incident with these events was the rioting related to ASEM 6, which caused major disturbances in the city centre and required a tremendous amount of police (and border guard) presence at the scene. The authorities were later criticised for their alleged use of excess force and apprehension of bystanders (YLE24, Helsingin Sanomat).

3.2 Current standing

Traditionally Finland and Helsinki have a good and relatively clean track record related to security incidents and that has yet to be changed.

Current global security standing has changed dramatically during the past year, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the war in Syria and Iraq. Several European countries have warned their citizens to remain vigilant as the risk of a terrorist attack is currently heightened, partly due to individuals who have fought in Syria and Iraq returning to their countries of origin and may potentially bring extremist acts alongside their return (British government).

Nevertheless, Finland has a reputation of an excellent police force and a stable political and economic environment. Overall crime statistics remain very low compared to the majority of other developed countries. (US Department of State)

3.2.1 Terrorism

The threat level of terrorism in Finland is low. (UK Government; US Department of State) As stated in the previous paragraph, there is, however, a heightened risk of terrorist acts globally due to the current state of geopolitical instability in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. This should be taken into special consideration if the guest line-up of the event consists mainly of citizens of countries taking part in the coalition against jihadist groups in the Middle East and even more so, if these guests are of American nationality. Nationality of event participants and country-specific risks will be discussed in following chapters.

Another issue are the individuals acting alone. Individuals acting as “lone wolves” have spurred a lot of discussion in the light of two relatively recent school shootings in Kauhajoki and Jokela in 2007 and 2008. The two cases were categorised as acts of a lone individual who was motivated merely by the discontentment to their personal lives and frustration with the government and its policies (BBC News, 2007). These acts have a lot in common with the Norwegian mass murderer Breivik, who shot and killed a total of 77 individuals on a youth social democrat summer camp on an island called Utøya, near Oslo in 2011. The incidents referred are incredibly rare, but remain a constant possibility and thus a threat to by-standers, which may include event participants and/or organisers. However, it is not feasible to plan for these situations specifically, but rather to proceed with a general evacuation and escape plan for individuals of high political or financial importance requiring special close protection.

Since 2003, six individuals were charged with collaborating with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab under the Finnish terrorism laws. In connection, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service has introduced a number of reforms to effectively counter the slightly rising threat of terrorism, as best practices are shared between the Nordic countries. (US Department of State).

3.2.2 Organised crime

Organised crime in the Finnish legislation is defined as a group of at least 3 individuals, acting for a set period of time and with an organised structure, collaborating in making crimes, of which the minimum sentence is at least four years. (FINLEX, National Bureau of Investigation, 2014) However, a different set of criteria concerning the definition of organised crime is set in a variety of EU-documents. Thus, the criminal gangs acting in Finland are divided into two categories: ones falling under the umbrella of EU-criterion and other organised crime collaborative. Until up to the end of the last decade, an alarming increase was to be observed in the numbers of the more dangerous, EU-criterion category groups. However, since the peak year

of 2011 the numbers have remained steady. According to police officials, there are currently approximately 80 organised crime groups. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014)

Despite the majority of the actors being groups with Finnish origins, organised crime, in its nature, often requires international cooperation, the groups operating in Finland are, as well, highly connected to Europe and the rest of the world. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014)

Organised crime typically occurs in the form of human and drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution. However, the main sources of income for the crime groups, especially motorcycle groups (which are the majority of the groups labelled 'organised crime'), are the offering of security services and drug trafficking. (National Bureau of Investigation, 2014.)

While not as prominent as in several other countries, the existence of organised crime in Finland is something to take into due consideration, especially if high-risk individuals are participating in a given event. Kidnapping and/or harming the individual, if he/she is somehow of importance to the crime group, is not excluded anywhere in the world. The proximity of Russia is a factor when examining the threat and risk from organised crime to an event, as Russian criminals and organised crime syndicates are not (necessarily) confined to their borders. These Russian groups are far more extended and often more sophisticated than their Finnish counterparts, so prudence is of the greatest use.

3.2.3 Petty crime

As with any capital city, Helsinki suffers from common crime including burglaries, pickpocketing, robberies etc. These are often crimes of opportunity, as most of the crimes relate to organised crime groups (US Department of State). Violent crime is a trending phenomenon in Finland, but often times results from intoxication and partly domestically.

Alcohol has traditionally been a major source of misbehaviour and contributes to criminal activity. The use of alcohol is easily visible in the nightlife of Helsinki and one does not need to seek for long to find intoxicated individuals. Public drinking and the related violent behaviour remain the largest challenge for the local police and thus efforts have been made to try to curb trend. Of violence on the street, 80% of the perpetrators are under the influence of an intoxicant (US Department of State).

The use of narcotics has slightly risen over the past decade, but remains generally low compared to other European countries, as Finland is primarily a transit point for traffickers rather than a destination.

3.2.4 Accidents, weather and other hazards

As a Nordic country, Finland experiences long, cold and dark winters, which may dramatically affect the safety on the road and render sidewalks impassable. Being on the southern end of Finland, Helsinki is spared from the most freezing temperatures but the high winds blowing from the Finnish bay together with daily mean sub-zero degrees can make the atmosphere intolerable for tourists. The lowest temperature measured in Helsinki was -34.3C in 1987.

3.3 Protection values and recommendations

High-security and other special events pose unique challenges for the security personnel and organiser. Every special event has different requirements due to the changing nature and atmosphere of the event, as one has to prepare very differently for a rock concert than to a general meeting. Even if the events falling under the category of 'high-security' might be varied in type, they all share some of the same principles by which security actors and professionals should assess the potentiality for risks and hazards.

If event being assessed and planned is a public event, the organizer is responsible of informing the Finnish Police, in this case the Helsinki Police Department, of their intentions to arrange one and might have to provide the authorities a detailed security plan. This is purely routine and the Finnish authorities seldom bother themselves with bringing up issues if there is none. As stated earlier, they will conduct a risk analysis of their own and adjust their response on that basis. The organizer might be exempt from this responsibility, if the event is small (few participants), or due to the nature or location of the event does not require any actions by the authorities to guarantee public safety and security. Special traffic control issues will be discussed in the following sections and in some cases they oblige the organizer to this necessity of informing. The notification has to be made minimum five (5) days prior to the event; the notification form in electronic format can be found on the website of the Finnish Police (<http://www.poliisi.fi>). If, due to the nature of the event, it is deemed necessary for the organizer to provide documentation of their insurance, it will be requested prior to the event. (Finnish Police, 2014).

Additionally, the organizer of a public meeting is responsible for notifying the Police at least six (6) hours prior to the commencement of the meeting. The notification can be either verbal or written, but must be given and/or left at the local precinct. A notification may also be considered valid if given late, if due to the nature of the meeting it does not pose a particular risk to the public. Such a notification can be made (recommended), about a demonstration of only a specified few individuals, with the only intention of informing the authorities of a par-

ticular occurrence. In such a case, the event is covered under the provisions of the Assembly Act, except § 5.

3.3.1 Outsourcing security provisions

For the vast majority of SME's (small and medium-sized enterprises), outsourcing security arrangements and services is a cost-effective solution and saves the management some of the headache. It is commonplace for high security event organizers to use contracted guarding/security services, if they are not inherently specialized in security themselves. Outsourcing can be the best answer in the procurement of security services, if the event is unusual or temporary, the purchasing entity is not capable of providing the required manpower/expertise or the costs of doing so result in excessive expenditures (Davies, S et al. 2008.)

There are many ways to scout out and find a suitable service provider, whether it would be a large private security company or a team of known close protection officers (provided that they act as a company). One must note at this point, that in order to exist and operate in the Finnish market, a security company has to be licensed, if it is providing security guard services. The licensing process is fairly straightforward, but does require at least one of the core members of the company to have undergone a special training (required by Finnish law, 12.4.2002/282) to become the designated duty manager. The duty manager is responsible for the correct guidance of the company, to ensure that the operations are managed as legislated. The licensing is provided by the National Police Board.

Prior to examining the potential security service candidates, one must carefully examine the current situation of the hosting organisation and conduct a thorough analysis (cost-benefit and current capabilities). This initiates the process to determine the costs related to the outsourcing process. In certain situations, a contrast has to be made between a third-party, outsourced, security service and a proprietary security service. Following the initial analysis, one has to identify and quantify liability issues and their costs. (Davies, S et al. 2008) The type of the event influences these numbers tremendously, so care is encouraged in its implementation. According to Hertig and Watson (Davies, S et al. 2008), a significant financial gain can be achieved through the process of outsourcing, as the incurring wages and other labour related costs result in lower total cost. Additionally, the reduction of liabilities can be seen as a way of facilitating corporate bureaucracy and lowering the burden of legal stipulations.

Advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing security services for the purpose a high security event include, but are not limited to:

Advantages

- Lower total costs (often the main reason for procurement)
- Less management burden in matters of HR; additional streamlining of existing administrative diagram, as the purchasing entity only has to deal with a few individuals from the service provider's side
- Mitigating liabilities

Disadvantages

- Loyalty of personnel might suffer
- Asset protection cannot be entirely outsourced; third-party actors only facilitate partially
- Minimal control (see streamlining of administration)

(Davies, S et al. 2008)

3.3.2 Pre- and post-event briefings

A preliminary meeting between all the actors in the organizing structure of an event is strongly recommended in order to ensure that everyone follows the steps accordingly. This pre-event briefing would be ideally conducted as a walkthrough, where all posts and critical customer “touchpoints” would be checked and verified. All responsibilities, duties, approaches and objectives should be clearly defined. The briefing should be planned and structured on the basis of the needs of the event, and the predefined outlines being sent to all participants prior to the meeting.

In practical terms, all the individuals participating in the organizing of the event are required to attend and to see to all aspects of the set-up with an equal level of interest. This should not be approached as a mere strategy meeting, but rather to pragmatically ascertain that all aspects are physically set up accordingly, equipment verified and personnel aware of their duties. Emergency exits are to be checked and shown to all participants. Additionally, this provides everyone the possibility to clear up any questions and misconceptions.

One should not forget the importance of a post-event briefing either, which is a prime occasion for increasing intellectual information (thus expertise) through addressing all issues arisen during or prior to the event. The organizers should go through all the same aspects as they did in the preliminary meeting and discuss the results. An overall summary should be drafted to facilitate the projection of these incidents and learning events for the future events.

3.3.3 Assessment of crowds

According to Christopher Innace (Davies, S et al. 2008) a common factor and the most threatening issue is the behaviour of crowds. He points out that crowds are capable of extensive violence and other misbehaviour due to the innate nature of human's group behaviour, which should be countered through effective crowd management measures.

The nature and type of a crowd dictates the majority of measures implemented to counter the related risks. Small, but high security level events may not be affected as much by crowd behaviour as peer pressure for good manners and self-control exceed those of disturbance. It is often the case, that in a familiar setting (i.e. familiar people) an individual is less likely to commit indecent acts or acts of mischief. This is reversed when the individual joins a large crowd and often loses his/her individuality resulting thus to a behaviour which would not normally be tolerated.

According to Innace, there are five different types of crowds:

- Acquisitive
 - o Acquisitive crowds are motivated by the desire of acquisition through receiving an item or meeting a person; if this need is fulfilled quite efficiently the crowd tends to remain calm and composed.
- Expressive
 - o Expressive crowds refer to a group of individuals expressing an opinion or feelings, usually in a demonstration or protest. Oftentimes remains calm and well behaved, but has the potentiality to become hostile.
- Spectator
 - o Spectator crowd is a group of individuals settling to watching a certain event or incident. Emotions may change rapidly if proper factors arise.
- Hostile
 - o Hostile crowds are motivated by feelings of anger and/or fear towards whichever entity they are faced with. Such crowd often resorts to the use violence to obtain their desire. Occurs in political rallies, riots and demonstrations. This is the type of crowd, which needs to be dispersed rapidly to avoid extensive damage to property and/or personnel.
- Escape
 - o Escape crowds are people trying to flee from something. This type of incident might occur during an emergency situation (natural disaster, fire, fight etc.), but can also be the result of a badly managed security force. Thus, special

care must be carried out to make sure that crowds do not get too large or get confined. Necessity of good evacuation routes is paramount.

Group dynamics and psychology are for the most part universal and thus no special emphasis needs to be made in order for an event to be made suitable for Helsinki. If anything, Finns are regarded as being calmer than their European counterparts and do not tolerate violence of any sort in public. (US Department of State).

Tightly knit with overall group dynamics is the manner in which one is to address a crowd. The way in which an individual responds or lacks a response is all in the context of the group, which might be very different to the private opinions of the person. The following rules should be kept in mind:

- Be concise with the delivery of the message
- Prior to the delivery, get the undivided attention of the crowd through a signal (verbal message or another sound)
- Address the crowd in a calm and clear manner
- Try to establish an eye contact to express authority (with all members of the crowd)
- Be firm and persuasive; above all, be polite

(Innace, 2008)

3.3.4 Traffic control

Organisers and the security personnel of an event need to consider traffic control measures already well prior to the event, as larger measures may require a permit from Helsinki City Council or the local police district. If in doubt, the organizer should verify this need from the local police, as there are no set minimum standards.

In a normal setting, it is the Finnish Police who deals with traffic control issues and handles the logistical procedures related to visits from heads of states etc. However, as the police force is slightly understaffed it does not concern itself with the physical implementation of other traffic control measures, except in an obvious emergency. Therefore measures and procedures made to an individual event need to be conducted with private personnel.

Traffic control measures are often of high visibility and therefore require good planning and equipment. Upon arrival to the event venue, implementation of the traffic control measures are part of the first aspect which the visitors see (also visible to passers-by) and thusly wields a potential impact on the public image of both the event organiser and the security entity.

Implementation methods for traffic control procedures for one-off events are simple, but important. Certain rules of thumb and generalities can be made for the purpose of facilitating these logistics. Security personnel designated for traffic duty need to be identifiable through their clothing and equipment. Minimum requirements for clothing should be that it is uniformed, preferably with a high-visibility vest and suited to weather to allow the personnel to remain in their post for extended periods of time. Equipment for the security personnel should consist of at least a flashlight, radio and a whistle.

As for local premise preparations related to traffic control, there should be one lane or lot reserved for the purpose of emergency vehicles and evacuations. This facilitates the extraction of medical emergency patients, but additionally the evacuation of other guests and quick removal of evicted or arrested individuals. The ability to rapidly remove potential perpetrators and the handling of incidents in a manner not visible to the guests has its advantages. A security company offering their services to these events should be equally concerned with the image of both their own personnel but also that of the client, and thus the handling of sensitive situations discreetly goes a long way. Prior to the event, the lane may also serve as a quick-stop loading/unloading area, where general supplies and security equipment can be delivered. A good while prior to the beginning of the event, the lanes should be closed and used only for matters of emergency. These rules can be relaxed only after the last guest of event has left.

3.3.5 Communications and liaisons

According to Mr Jari Väinölä, a long-serving police officer and an the ex security director of Sampo Bank group, communication between the security company, the organizing team and even the hosting party's external communications team is paramount to the success of an event. The importance of communication cannot be stressed enough as the basis for all analysis is the acknowledgement of all possible risks and outcomes, which cannot be assessed and more importantly, identified, in a solitary manner. A security service provider should not be a security "purist", but rather to conform to the needs of the client and the entity being served. Thus, as a client might have a largely different view on security matters than those of the security entity, a common ground and a compromise needs to be found in order for the preparations to be conducted accordingly. This would be the starting point all of event preparations and the same level of communication between the actors have to continue throughout the process. This is in order for the security aspects to be embedded into all sections of the planning process and implementations. As stated, communication is an embedded, not a separate, part of the process.

Another point to be made in regards to communication arrangements in general would be that a well thought-out procedure should be in place in case of a security anomaly or disruption, so as to effectively counter all possible negative outcomes. For example, this would be a situation where the security entity effectively tackles a security incident, which is simultaneously communicated to the communications team who then produces a piece of public information prior to rumours spreading out.

On the field, communication methods for security officers and other related event actors should be implemented so as to be able to communicate and exchange information between all entities: for example with the use of portable radios with each entity using their own channel (ex. authorities on channel 1, event organisers on channel 2 etc.). Back-up batteries and equipment should be at hand at all times. Secondary means of communication are a must in a high security event, so as to be able to resort to a functional line/channel and for the tools to be able to accommodate the increase in traffic during emergency situations. The functionality of the communication equipment should be checked at every possible time, to make sure that the transmission and reception capabilities of radios and other methods are working accordingly.

3.3.6 Evacuation procedures

In public events, as with all buildings comprising of at least three residential apartments, a dedicated emergency plan is mandatory (SPEK, 2014). In an emergency plan evacuation procedures and routes are to be specified. In depth emergency plans and guidelines for creating one are plenty, but some of the aspects to be detailed are the place of assembly, and instruction on what is to follow an evacuation (be it instructions from management or redirection towards a parking a lot etc.). Innace specifies, that a cordon of approximately 2 meters should be implemented around the inside of the perimeter, if possible or if the event is held outdoors.

In terms of the government's civil defence, according to the Rescue Act (29.4.2011/379), the relevant authorities are required to participate in the planning of evacuation procedures when dealing with events or locations of national interest (Helsinki City Rescue Department, 2015). In practice, the scope of this responsibility is very limited and reserved only to events including an extraordinarily large number of participants. The main task for the authorities in this respect is to provide guidelines and evacuation procedures for the government and local jurisdictions for national emergency purposes. One must keep in mind that the contents of this paper are no substitute for a thorough and well-executed emergency and security plan, which embeds the related content mentioned here.

4 Conclusion

A variety of information resources and interviews conducted for the purposes of this thesis all explicitly agree on the common questions regarding the level of professionalism in event security and the current security situation in Helsinki. However, after data analysis, a few issues were identified above others.

On the global scale Finland and Helsinki are almost 'safe havens' with regards to public security and the efficiency of law enforcement agencies. In addition, strict regulation is a contributing factor to this sense of security and overall good performance on international comparisons. While criticized in its home country, the level of regulation yields an exceptional level of thoroughness and precision in safety and security auditing of public and private domains. Implemented through overseeing government authorities, these regulations and their fulfilment are constantly monitored by the Finnish police and the local Rescue departments (and the customs, where applicable). In regards to event planning, a variety of permits and codes have to be fulfilled in order for a public event to take place, and even with private events the establishment and buildings need to succumb to the same scrutiny to make sure fire code is respected and that the guests are not in any foreseeable peril. As a result, the default level of security is augmented through scrutinized planning processes in part of the authorities, but also the high level of human capital observed in the Nordic countries yielding reliable results. One might also get the illusion from the analysis of the current situation that there are no considerable risks to worry about when organizing events in Helsinki. This illusion of a lull in security issues should be treated as one, but the fact remains that Helsinki experiences an overall safe and secure environment, due to the many contributing factors discussed in this paper.

Deriving from the interviews of Mr Väinölä and Mr Salmi, both identified a key deficiency in today's event planning to be the low level of knowledge in matters of security and the lack or minimal amount of security preparations. As suggested in chapter 3.3.2, an emphasis on pre-event planning could be seen as a method of increasing the overall level of security while simultaneously augmenting the level of professionalism greatly. All actors within the organizing team of an event are not to be expected to possess in-depth knowledge in security issues but this should be countered through increased and effective communication between the planning actors, where it is often the case, that each member represents one aspect of the event's entirety. In this manner, issues concerning not only security, could be taken into consideration and risks managed as efficiently as possible. According to Mr Väinölä, communication between the organizers and the authorities should be the default starting point, but can be foregone with events and cases of lower significance (where not required by law). In the case of a one-off event, all security precautions remain on the shoulders of the organizing

entity, thus the procurement of a third-party security service or usage of corporate security professionals from within the company need to have a say in the preparations. Outsourcing can also be used to bolster and reinforce the already possessed expertise of the company. Methods and advantages of outsourcing were examined in chapter 3.3.1.

Additionally, one is to observe a distinct lack of relevant security training and education in Finland, with the exception of the degree programmes in Laurea University of Applied Sciences. Majority of security entrepreneurs and actors originate from the ranks of the military, police or have been procured from abroad, where more specialized education is available and the demand for such is greater. Prior to the establishment of the degree programmes, the security scene in Finland (thus Helsinki) relied solely on these career officers thus resulting in a variety of schools under the security umbrella, where each individual ex-officer had their own methods and the regulation was slightly looser. Thankfully, corrective measures were taken to provide the current labour market with corporate security professionals possessing the right kind of professional toolkit, while also creating a framework of comparison for higher education in the field of security. This amendment will have affected and contributed to the high level of professionalism observable today, resulting in the augmentation of the level of security and thus boosting the event security subset further.

4.1 Comments

While by no means surprising, the results clearly bring out aspects to be improved, which can only taken as a positive outcome. Translating this into the level and amount of security education provided in universities and professional schools would have a tremendous impact on the field as a whole.

Slightly unpredictably, the collection of research data was, for the most part, facile and readily available. However, the issues where exact information and in-depth knowledge would have given this thesis much more academic substance, the data was extremely restricted or classified in its entirety. This can be forgiven for law enforcement instances, but the withdrawal of important research information compelled me to make changes into the outlining and core definitions of this thesis. Research on this field is often confined to the internals of government agencies and private security companies, but high-level public research into it demands an opening. As a principle, academic research should be free and not swayed with corporate or governmental bias. Withdrawal of key information has its place, but also affects the broader evolution of the field when the quality and amount of research stagnates. As a researched opinion, my recommendation for the field of event security (and security in general) is increasing the amount of research into its core issues and subsequently educating the actors dealing with them. This does not confine it to be solely security professionals, but also

corporate managers who are in charge of security expenditure. Additionally, as the manner in which security is to be implemented should embed it into the core processes of the entity (i.e. event), all actors (for example: communications, human resources, finances, catering etc.) should possess at least basic understanding of corporate security principles.

4.2 Further research

Unfolding the wrapper of the current situation reveals certain aspects where academic research and professional growth should have their place. As mentioned above, the aspects are the minimal level preparedness and the lack of proper security knowledge on the part of the event organizers (and more widely in the corporate world).

Professional growth through research is an ideal model, where, through new research data, new content could be embedded into the syllabuses of the security training establishments (notably Laurea UAS and professional schools). On the basis of this thesis' content, a recommendation on research subjects benefitting the proposed approach would include:

- Analysis on the effect of the location (venue) of the event to the behaviour of guests and security incidents
- Analysis on the differences in outcomes where the security service provider is in-house personnel/contracted
- External communication with regards to high-security events

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